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Summary findings
Pargal, Hettige, Singh, and Wheeler start from the  -Abatement is generally subject to significant scale
premise that governments act as agents of the public in  economies.
regulating pollution, using the instruments at their  -Within-country  variations in labor and energy prices
disposal. But when formal regulatory mechanisms are  have little impact on pollution intensity.
absent or ineffective, communities will seek other means  *Community  incomes have a powerful negative
of translating their preferences into reality. Recent  association with pollution intensity.
empirical work suggests the widespread existence of such  Their findings on community income are especially
informal regulation:  communities are often able to  important,  as they suggest a powerful role for informal
negotiate with or otherwise informally pressure polluting  regulation whether  or not formal regulation is in place.
plants in their vicinity to clean up.  The impact of income disparity on intercounty
Their thesis is that such informal regulation is likely  differences in U.S. pollution intensities seems to match
wherever  formal regulation leaves a gap between actual  the impact in Indonesia. Undoubtedly, this reflects
and locally preferred environmental quality. They use  differences in both preference for environmental quality
plant-level data from Indonesia and the United States - and ability to bring pressure on polluting factories. The
two countries that are very different, both socio-  fact that such disparities exist in the United States, even
economically and in terms of pollution  regulation - to  for traditionally regulated pollutants, shows that U.S.
test a model of equilibrium pollution under informal  regulation has not been able to ensure uniform
regulation.  environmental quality for all citizens regardless of
Their results suggest three common elements across  income class.
countries and pollutants:
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This paper starts from the premise that governments act as agents of the public in
regulating pollution, using the various instruments at their disposal.  However, when
formal regulatory mechanisms are absent or ineffective, communities will seek other
means of translating their preferences into reality.  Recent empirical work has indicated
the widespread existence of such 'informal regulation:' communities are often able to
negotiate with or otherwise informally pressure polluting plants in their vicinity to clean
up.
Formal regulatory mechanisms include both quantity-based instruments (e.g.
effluent concentration standards, technology standards) and market-based instruments
(e.g. emissions charges, abatement credits, tradable permits).  Informal regulation can
also take many forms, including demands for compensation by community groups; social
ostracism of the firm's employees; the threat of physical violence; boycotting the firm's
products; and monitoring and publicizing the firm's emissions.'  Implicitly, such actions
force recognition of the community's property right in the local environment.  They
frequently work because firms do not operate in a social vacuum.  When informal
regulation is effective, local factories face a positive expected penalty for polluting.
Informal regulation need not be limited to cases where fornal  regulation is absent.
If formal regulatory standards and institutions exist, the most effective informal
regulatory tactic may be reporting the violation of legal standards.  This will be easier if
information on standards is widespread, monitoring is relatively costless, and violators
can be easily identified.  A second 'formal'  channel for informal regulation is pressure on
regulators to tighten local monitoring and enforcement. Profit-maximizing firms will
reduce pollution to the point where the marginal cost of abatement equals the expected
marginal penalty for noncompliance.  Since regulators' resources are limited,  many
regulatory violations are either undetected or lightly penalized because legal proceedings
are costly.2 In this context, public pressure on regulators can be an important
countervailing force.
Our thesis is that such informal regulation will be likely wherever formal regulation
leaves a gap between actual and locally-preferred environmental quality.  If our
hypothesis is correct, we would expect widespread informal regulation in developing
countries where formal regulation of pollution is absent or ineffective.  However,
infornal  regulation may also be common in industrial countries which have nationally-
IFor numerous examples, see Pargal and Wheeler (1996).
2 For recent evidence from North America, see Deily and Gray (1  991), Dion, Lanoie and Laplante (1996),
Magat and Viscusi (1990), and Russell (1990).  Similar evidence for Asia can be found in Dasgupta,
Huq and Wheeler (1997), Hartman, Huq and Wheeler (1996), O'Connor (1994), and Wang and
Wheeler (1996).
1uniform regulatory standards.  In the latter case, actual formal and informal pressure on
plants to abate may vary significantly with local preferences and organizational
capabilities.  We would expect informal regulation to be strongest in richer communities,
because they will have greater preference for environmental quality and more knowledge
of pollutant risks.  In addition, such communities are more capable of exerting political,
social and economic pressure.
In this paper, we use plant- and community-level data from the US and Indonesia to
test for the effect of informal regulation in a more general model of  'equilibrium
pollution.'  This model, first developed in Pargal and Wheeler (1996), posits the existence
of community-level emissions equilibria at points determined by local environmental
demand and supply schedules. Industry's environmental demand (or pollution) schedule
reflects the marginal cost of abatement. T-he  position and slope of the schedule will be
pollutant-specific and will depend on three sets of variables: the expected cost of
pollution, determnined  by formal and informal regulation; standard economic factors such
as abatement scale economies and relative input prices; and a variety of plant and firm
characteristics such as equipment vintage, efficiency and ownership. The positions and
slopes of environmental supply schedules for specific pollutants will also reflect three
sets of factors: community perception of damage; valuation of that damage; and the
ability to impose costs on polluting facilities via formal or informal regulatory channels.
The intersection of environmental demand and supply schedules is, of course, a
familiar conceptual device in environmental economics textbooks. 3 However, the
conventional treatment identifies 'optimal' pollution at the intersection of marginal cost
and marginal damage schedules, implicitly assuming transactions costs to be zero for the
regulator.  By contrast, we assume that formal and informal regulation are affected by the
costs of information, organization and enforcement.  Thus, local equilibrium emissions
may differ significantly from 'optimal' emissions which are derived solely from marginal
cost and damage functions.  Of course, they may also differ significantly from the
emissions which are mandated by formal regulatory standards.
The US and Indonesia provide a good test case, since they are near the opposite
ends of the regulatory and socioeconomic spectra.  In the US, many air and water
pollutants have been regulated at the national level for more than two decades.  The US
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has a large staff, good technical facilities, and a
record of tough enforcement action in many cases.  Indonesia, by contrast, had no
regulatory standards before 1992. At present, enforcement of these standards is mostly
limited to a few water pollutants.  The monitoring and enforcement capabilities of
Indonesia's National Pollution Control Agency (BAPEDAL) are extremely limited;
See for examnple  Tietenberg  (1992).
2technical staff are almost nonexistent; and there have been very few formal actions taken
against noncompliant facilities.
The same extremes apply to socioeconomic data.  The US is one of the world's
richest, best-educated societies, while Indonesia has only begun to reach lower-middle-
income status after three decades of rapid growth and industrialization.  Both societies
are, however, extremely diverse both geographically and socially.  In addition, both have
sharply skewed distributions of community income.  Thus, it is entirely plausible to
assume that informal regulation plays an important, albeit different, role in the two
societies.
Across communities, we would certainly expect plant-level equilibrium emissions
intensities (or emissions per unit of output) to be higher in Indonesia. However, we
would also expect substantial inter-community differentials in both countries and,
possibly, an overlap in the tails of the distributions.
In this paper, we compare econometric analyses of plant-level emissions across
communities in the two countries. Our geographic units are counties in the US and
kabupaten (sub-provincial units) in Indonesia. For the US, we include regressions for
emissions of two regulated air pollutants (Total Suspended Particulates (TSP), Sulphur
Dioxide (SO2)); two regulated water pollutants (Biological Oxygen Demand (BOD),
Total Suspended Solids (TSS)); and total emissions of toxic compounds, many of which
are not formally regulated at present. For Indonesia, we reproduce results for BOD which
were previously reported in Pargal and Wheeler (1996).  BOD is the only pollutant for
which large-sample data are currently available in Indonesia.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we briefly
describe the institutional setting in the US and Indonesia.  Section 3 describes our model
of equilibrium emissions under formal and informal regulation.  Section 4 specifies the
regression equation and describes our data.  Results and implications are reported in
section 5, and a summary and conclusions are presented in Section 6.
32.  INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
2.1 Regulation in the US
Criteria air and water pollutants have long been regulated by command-and-control
methods in the US.  Air pollution control has historically been based on uniform
emissions standards, starting with the creation of the EPA and the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1970 (Tietenberg, 1992). EPA regulatory acts have included ambient air
quality standards; the designation of areas as non-attainment regions; the application of
guidelines for 'prevention of significant deterioration;' and mandated installation of
specific control technologies at the plant level.  Substantial noncompliance penalties
exist, and there is little flexibility in the imposition of environmental regulations under
the Clean Air Act.
The control of conventional water pollutants has also been based on national
effluent standards at the industry level, which are derived from technological
specifications. There is less emphasis on uniform ambient standards than there is for air
quality regulation, possibly reflecting the different impacts of pollution in the two media.
At present, responsibility for regulating the manufacture and use of toxic substances is
shared by several agencies (e.g., EPA, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA),  and the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)). The handling, shipping, and
disposal of hazardous or toxic pollutants in the US are regulated by the EPA.  Legal
recourse for damage under common law is a valuable complement to these regulations.
Some toxics are clearly very dangerous, but many others have uncertain effects on human
health and ecosystem functioning.  At present, the EPA does not have safety or
'emission/effluent' standards for the majority of toxic pollutants.  As an aid to community
awareness of exposure risk, however, it has since 1987 published an annual Toxic
Release Inventory (TRI).  The TRI, which was legislated in 1986,4 is based on mandated
disclosure of toxic releases and transfers by US industrial facilities.  Substantial penalties
can be imposed for failure to comply with reporting requirements, but the TRI is basically
a public information tool.  It is up to local governments or community groups to assess
the performance of listed firms in their vicinity, and act upon this information as they
deem fit - by negotiation, public appeal, citizen suits, etc.
To summarize, the US has administered a system of formal, command-and-control
regulation of criteria air and water pollutants for over two decades. 5 Analysis of plant-
The TRI was mandated  by the Emergency  Planning  and Community  Right-to-Know  Act.
Limited  use of market-based  instruments  has begun,  notably  in the case of the national  trading  program
for SO 2 emissions  permits  under the revised  Clean  Air Act. For the most part, however,  the US
system  continues  to rely on command-and-control  regulation.
4level emissions of these pollutants should therefore provide a good test of the degree to
which enforcement of national uniform standards has dominated local environmental
demand-supply considerations in pollution control.  By contrast, the lack of formal
regulation for toxic emissions provides a good case for analyzing the influence of
informal regulation.
2.2 Regulation in Indonesia
Indonesia began formal regulation in 1992, with establishment of maximum
allowable volumes and concentrations (in kg./ton of output) for emissions of BOD and
other water pollutants from 14 broadly-defined industry sectors (e.g. textiles; wood
pulping).  Although self-reported BOD emissions are now mandated by law, reporting
has been extremely sparse until recently.6 Until 1995, the only consistent program of
monitoring and pressure for compliance was a voluntary arrangement instituted in 1989.7
This PROKASIH or 'Clean Rivers,' program, covers about 5% of Indonesian
manufacturing facilities in eleven river basins on the islands of Java, Sumatra and
Kalimantan.  While it has succeeded in eliciting significant pollution reductions from
some of Indonesia's largest polluters 8 PROKASIH represents only the first stage of
regulation.  Formal regulation of air and toxic pollution has just been introduced.  Thus,
Indonesia provides a very good test for the significance of informal regulation in a
developing country.
3.  A MODEL OF EQUILIBRIUM EMISSIONS UNDER INFORMAL
REGULATION
3.1 Informal regulation and Coasian economics
Our model of informal regulation has been developed in Pargal and Wheeler (1996),
so this paper presents a summary version.  The model follows convention in defining
emissions as the use of 'environmental services' - an additional production factor in an
augmented KLEM (Capital, Labor, Energy, Materials) framework. The implicit 'price' of
pollution is the expected penalty or compensation exacted by the affected community.  It
is different from other input prices in that it may be plant-specific. Optimizing
6 Expansion  of self-reporting  has recently  begun  under  the PROPER  program  for rating  and publicly
disclosing  the environmental  performance  of industrial  facilities.  For further  discussion,  see Afsah
and Wheeler  (1996).
As noted above,  the PROPER  program  is now  providing  additional  pressure  for compliance. The
program  is still  in its introductory  phase,  but has  recently  expanded  to coverage  of approximately  four
hundred  major  polluters.
See  Afsah,  Laplante  and Makarim  (1996)  for a detailed  analysis  of the PROKASIH  program.
5communities may tolerate polluting factories when they provide a lot ofjobs,  local
contracts or tax revenues.  Conversely, they may pay particular attention to plants whose
location makes them easy to monitor (e.g., large, isolated facilities) or particularly
damaging to the local environment (e.g. pulp mills immediately upstream from local
fisheries or irrigated fields).
There is clearly a relationship between the concept of informal regulation and the
Coasian view of environmental economics.  Both consider the process by which
externalities are internalized in the absence of regulatory agents, and both acknowledge
that an externality can be reciprocal (i.e., due to the polluter, the pollutee or both9 l0).
However,  the traditional Coasian solution remains dependent on a well-defined legal and
institutional environment even when regulatory agents are absent.  Efficient outcomes
require accurate information about pollution problems, clear delineation of environmental
property rights, and courts which are able and willing to enforce legal agreements.
We do not question the relevance of these conditions in many cases, but our view of
informal regulation extends the Coasian interpretation in two ways.  First, community
pressure clearly affects polluters' behavior, even where there is little accurate
information, no explicit agreement about environmental property rights, and no court
system able to adjudicate settlements.  Secondly, our research and other studies have
suggested that the conceptual distinction between Coasian arrangements and traditional
regulation is often blurred in practice.  Regulators must confront strategic behavior by
polluters and frequent renegotiation of compliance schedules and penalties.  Community
pressure may significantly affect these interactions, creating de facto informal regulation
even in countries where information is plentiful, formal regulations are clearly defined,
and the legal system functions effectively.
3.2 Environmental supply
Informal regulation reflects local factories' acceptance of the community's property
right in the environment.  Communities use their leverage to impose penalties (costs) on
firms whose emissions are judged unacceptable.  As factories use up more local
environmental quality, affected communities will impose higher costs.  From the
viewpoint of industry, the result of informal regulation is an 'environmental supply
schedule', which shifts inward as average community income increases. 11 However, this
In some  cases  an externality is generated when a household or firm moves into proximity with a polluter. In
the law, this is called "coming to the nuisance". See Cooter and Ulen (1988), p. 181.
10For  further discussion, see Brown (1973); Calabresi (1970); Coelho (1975); Coase (1960); Demsetz
(1963,1967,1972); Diamond (1974); Hartman (1982); McKean (1970).
l  Field survey evidence from Southeast Asia suggests that this schedule will depend on several factors:
the level of community organization, information, legal or political recourse, media coverage, NGO
6supply schedule is expected to be flat with respect to income if formal regulation is
successful in equalizing emissions across locations.
3.3 Environmental Demand
Faced with an environmental supply schedule, each plant adjusts pollution to the
optimal point along its pollution demand schedule, derived from its cost minimization
exercise.  As noted in Pargal and Wheeler (1996), potentially-significant determinants of
the environmental demand schedule include sector, output, relative input prices, vintage,
productive efficiency and, in the case of Indonesia, ownership.  The latter variable is not a
significant source of variation in the US data, given the preponderance of domestic,
private finrns in the economy.  However, in Indonesia we might expect the partial effect
on pollution intensity to be positive for state ownership and negative for multinationals.
Pollution seems likely to be complementary to material inputs, but its cross-price
relationships with labor, capital and energy are not clearly signed.  For this study, we
have been able to construct local labor and energy price indices for both the US and
Indonesia, and a proxy for materials price variation across regions in Indonesia.  The
absence of capital price information is not a major concern, since both of our samples are
cross-sectional and we would not anticipate much within-country variation in the price of
this factor.
Well-managed plants should generate fewer waste residuals per unit of output and
respond more readily to incentives for pollution control.  To the extent that profitability
reflects efficiency, well-run plants should also have more discretionary funds available to
respond to demands for cleanup.  Profitability, however, is a double-edged sword in this
context, since firms which have avoided pollution abatement should have lower operating
costs, ceteris paribus.  Thus, while efficient management should have an unambiguously
negative effect on a plant's pollution intensity, proxies based on measures of profitability
might have a 'perversely'  positive effect in regressions if the cost-saving component were
dominant.
3.4  Equilibrium Pollution
Following the supply/demand derivation in Pargal and Wheeler (1996), we solve for
the following reduced-form equation which characterizes a plant's equilibrium pollution:
presence, the efficiency of existing formal regulation, and the opportunity cost of time.  Many of
these factors are correlated with community income levels.  For more detailed discussion, see Huq
and Wheeler (1993), Hartman, Huq and Wheeler (1996) and Hettige, Huq, Pargal and Wheeler
(1996).
7(1) Pij = f(Wlj, Wej, Wmj, Qi, si, vi, fi, mi, gi, ni, aj, Yj)
Righthand variables for the regression equation are defined as follows, with
expected signs of estimated parameters: 
2
Standard demand variables
?  Wlj  Manufacturing wage in county j
?  Wej  Energy price index in county j
- Wmj  Material input price index in county j
+  Qi  Total output of plant i [O  < elasticity < 1]
?  si  Sector of plant i
Firm-specific variables
+  Vi  Age of plant i
?  fi  Factor productivity of plant i
mi  Multinational status of plant i (1 if multinational)
?  gi  Public/private status of plant  (1 if public)
Informal regulation variables:
?  ni  Share of plant i in county j's manufacturing employment
?  aj  Population density in county j
- yj  Per capita income in county j
3.5 The Roles of Sector and Location
As previously mentioned, broadly-defined industry sectors differ greatly in
average pollution intensity of production (see Hettige, et. al. (1994)).  However, even in
sectors with high pollution potential, emissions can be substantially reduced through
process modification or installation of end-of-pipe abatement equipment.  Investors make
simultaneous choices of products, processes and abatement levels, taking relative prices
at different locations into account.  In general, we would expect emissions per unit of
output to be relatively elastic with respect to the local 'price of pollution.'
12 See Pargal  and Wheeler  (1996) for a detailed  discussion.
83.5.1 Possible Endogeneity of Income
Our model employs community mean income as an exogenous variable, but we
recognize the risk of endogeneity.  Within an urban region, where residential mobility is
comparable to factory mobility, an increase in pollution-intensive manufacturing in some
areas may induce a decline in their average income as richer people move away and lower
property prices attract poorer people.  This may well have been a significant factor in
some US metropolitan areas.  If so, the result would be an upward-biased estimate of the
impact of informal regulation (proxied by community income) on plants' abatement
decisions.  However, our results (Section 5) suggest that simultaneity bias is not a
significant problem for our US regressions.
In the Indonesian case, the prior argument for endogeneity is far less compelling.
The units of analysis are kabupaten drawn from a broad spectrum of urban and rural areas
in Java, Sumatra and Kalimantan; their relative social and economic status has changed
little since 1975. However, most of Indonesia's manufacturing has developed during the
past two decades.  Therefore industrial location clearly dominates residential migration
in the Indonesian case.  If there is any bias in our estimates, we are confident that it is
small.
3.5 Econometric Specification
We have no strong prior views on appropriate specification of the estimating
equation for equilibrium pollution.  Since our theory of informal regulation has not been
extensively tested, it would seem better to start with a relatively simple and tractable
empirical exercise.  The pollution price variable (Wp) is endogenous, with many
determinants, and there many plant-specific demand-shift variables in the model.  We
therefore limit ourselves to estimation of log-log regressions, using dummies for
categorical variables.
Heteroscedasticity across observations, often a problem with cross section
analyses, is not a significant problem in our US data.  For Indonesia, we have reported
White heteroscedasticity-consistent results.  Although there is fairly significant
correlation between different groups of variables in our Indonesia dataset,
multicollinearity does not appear to have been a problem for estimation.
4.  THE DATA
For the US, the data used for this study were obtained by merging together
establishment level manufacturing data from the US Census Bureau's Longitudinal
Research Database (LRD), county income and population data from the Census Bureau's
'USA counties on CD ROM' (COSTAT) and EPA data from various sources: the TRI for
9toxics, the Aerometric Information Retrieval System (AIRS) for air emissions, and the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) for water pollutant
discharges.
Indonesian manufacturing and socio-economic census data have been combined
with observations on plant-level water pollution measured as part of the Environment
Ministry's PROKASIH (Clean Rivers) Program during the period 1989-1990. Our plant-
level emissions data have been provided by BAPEDAL, Indonesia's National Pollution
Control Agency in the Ministry of Environment.  Data on plant characteristics and
socioeconomic characteristics of communities have been provided by BPS (Indonesia's
Central Statistics Bureau), and are described in Pargal and Wheeler (1996).
4.1  US Variables
For the US case the dependent variables in our analysis include two air pollutants
(SO 2 and TSP), two water pollutants (BOD and TSS) and the total quantity of toxic
releases.  We measure emissions volume in kg/day for both BOD and Total Suspended
Solids (TSS);  toxics are measured in pounds per year, as are SO 2 and TSP.
Our data on US plant characteristics, drawn from the LRD and COSTAT, include
measures of output value, age and county-level employment share.  As in the Indonesian
case, we have used value added per employee as a proxy for productive efficiency.  We
have also included dummy variables for all nine Lwo-digit  US SIC manufacturing sectors.
Data for our US energy price index were obtained for each state for 1987 from the
State Energy Price and Expenditure Report of 1991, published by the Energy Information
Administration.  This is a composite index for the industrial sector created from coal,
natural gas, petroleum, and electricity prices, in dollars per million BTU.  The local
manufacturing wage in the US was computed from the LRD as the mean plant wage for
each county.  We lack direct measures of relative materials prices by sector, and have
excluded them from the US regressions.
4.2  Data Description
The US data set used for toxics is the largest, with 12,005 observations common
to the LRD and TRI.  The characteristics of over 2,000 matching counties cover a wide
distribution, with first and third quartiles of population density and per capita income
ranging from 109 to 1403 people per square mile, and  $10,000 to $13,075 respectively.
Plant characteristics for the toxics sample are represented by a mean age of 25 years,
mean wage of $22,000 per annum and a mean local employment share of 5.6%.
The air pollution data for the US include 1987 emissions information from 878
plants in the AIRS database which could be matched with the LRD.  The matching
10community characteristics are less widely distributed, ranging between 139 and 1281
persons per square mile for first to third quartiles of population density and between
$10,000 and $12,500 for per capita income.  Plants in this sample have a mean age of 27
years, mean wage of $26,000 a year and mean local employment share of 8.5%.
The US water pollution data come from a sample of 1,368 plants in EPA's
NPDES database which could be matched with the LRD.  Here the matching counties are
less densely populated: First and  third quartiles range between 74 and 742 people per
square mile.  Per capita income is similar to the other data sets, with an interquartile range
of $9,607 to $12,168.  The plants have a mean age of 27 years, and employ a mean of 4.1
% of county workers at a mean annual wage of $26,000.
For Indonesia, out of a total sample of 253 plants, we have exact ownership
information on 246: of these 3 are wholly foreign owned, 13 are completely owned by the
government and 178 are private domestic firms.  Factory age ranges from 0 years (2
firms) to 90 years (2 firms), with the median age of firms being 10 years.  The geographic
spread of the data is restricted to three islands - Java (189 plants), Sumatra (40 plants),
and Kalimantan (24 plants) - and 8 provinces.  Forty one ISIC codes or sectors are
represented in the dataset, and firms range in size from 22 to 41,821 employees, with
share in kabupaten employment varying from 0.02% to 91%.  The kabupatens
represented in the data are quite varied as well: 1990 population density ranges from 3.4
to 53,876 persons per square km., the proportion of the population with more than a
primary education varies between 6.85% and 48.5%, and mean annual per capita
expenditure varies from Rp. 256,447 to Rp. 837,277 (1990 Rp.).
5.  RESULTS
The econometric results for Indonesia from Pargal and Wheeler (1996) are
reproduced in Table 1, while comparative results for the US are reported in Table 2.
Since we regress log (emissions) on log (output), the regression coefficients should be
interpreted as partial effects on pollution intensity.  The single exception is the result for
log (output) itself, which should be reduced by 1 for interpretation in emissions-intensity
form.
5.1 Standard Demand Variables
Among the standard demand variables, only scale economies emerge consistently
in our results.  In all cases except SO2 in the US, the output elasticity of emissions is
significantly less than one.  Thus, emissions intensity generally declines with plant
output, reflecting scale economies of abatement.
11The input price results show no consistent pattern of complementarity or
substitutability with labor and energy across pollutants.  For Indonesian BOD emissions,
only the crude materials price proxy is significant.  In the US, there is evidence of
significant emissions-labor substitutability for TSS and toxic emissions; emissions-
energy substitutability for US SO 2 and emissions-energy complementarity for US TSS.
Otherwise, cross-price effects are not significant.  Within countries, labor and energy
price variation seems to have had little effect on emissions intensity.
5.2 Firm- and Plant-Specific Variables
Except for sectoral differences, plant and firm characteristics show little evidence
of consistent and significant impacts in these regressions.  Value added per worker does
have a negative, significant association with emissions intensity for the two variables
which are not formally regulated: US toxics and Indonesian BOD.  For the formally-
regulated US pollutants, however, the results for this variable are inconsistent.  We find
no effect for water pollutants, but strong and significant positive associations for both air
pollutants.  These results suggest a different balance in air and water emissions between
pure efficiency effects and profitability from lower abatement costs
Significant vintage effects are observable only for water pollution in Indonesia.
This may not be too surprising, since even older US facilities have operated under strict
regulation for a long time.
Our results for sectoral dummy variables are generally consistent with
expectations about relative pollution intensity.  In the case of Indonesia, where five
sectors are amply represented in the data set, our results show that four are more BOD-
intensive than other manufacturing sectors: Textiles, Leather Tanning, Food Products
and Pulp and Paper.  The BOD intensity for Wood Products is not significantly different
from the average for other manufacturing.  In the US case, we have included dummy
variables for all two-digit SIC sectors, using Food Products as the excluded sector. This
sector is known to have high intensity in organic water pollution (BOD), and relatively
low intensity in toxics and standard air pollutants.  Our results follow this pattern, and
indicate the following relative intensities for other sectors (ceteris paribus): Textiles and
Leather, Pulp and Paper, Chemicals and Metals have the highest intensity in toxics, while
Food Products have the lowest;  Textiles, Non-Metallic Minerals (principally cement)
and Metals are most intensive in TSP, while Machinery and Miscellaneous
Manufacturing are least intensive; Textiles and Leather and Chemicals are the most SO2-
intensive, while Machinery is least intensive.  Not surprisingly, only Pulp and Paper is
significantly more intensive in organic water pollution (BOD) than Food Products,
although Textiles and Leather Tanning are also relatively BOD-intensive, as in the
Indonesian case;  Metals and Machinery are least BOD-intensive.  Pulp and Paper and
Miscellaneous Manufacturing are most intensive in TSS (total suspended solids), while
Machinery is least intensive.
12To summarize, our results suggest that plant and firm characteristics are more
important determinants of emissions intensity in weakly-regulated economies.  In the US
we find strong scale and sectoral effects, but no consistent effect for vintage and
efficiency.  However, the Indonesian results for vintage, efficiency and public ownership
are consistent with results obtained for Bangladesh, India and Thailand in other studies
(Huq and Wheeler, 1993; Hartman, Huq and Wheeler, 1997).
5.3 Informal Regulation Variables
Our results suggest that informal regulatory forces are pervasive, even when
strong formal regulation is in place.  In both the US and Indonesia, the elasticity of all
emissions intensities with respect to comrnunity income is negative, large, and generally
highly significant (the only exception is US BOD).  The estimated elasticity for the
regulated US air pollutants is approximately equal to the  Indonesian elasticity for BOD;
US water pollutants and toxic emissions have lower, but still substantial, elasticities. As
previously noted, these results may reflect income-related differences in both preferences
and power.
The income result is critical for our central hypothesis, and there is some risk (see
Section 3.5.1) of upward bias in the estimated impact when per capita income is used as a
proxy for local informal regulation.13 However, the argument for endogeneity is based
on co-location of poor communities with pollution-intensive industry sectors.  By
introducing sectoral dummy variables, our equations measure the impact of income on
pollution intensity after dirty-sector location decisions have already been made.  As we
noted in the previous discussion, our results confirm what is generally known about the
relative pollution intensity of industry sectors.  With the sector controls in place, our
regressions allow us to focus on determinants of within-sector pollution abatement.
In a second, independent check for significant bias, we have analyzed the
relationship between county income per capita and the location of the most highly-
polluting US industry sectors.  Using very different criteria, several empirical studies
(Robison, 1988; Tobey, 1990; Mani, 1996; Hettige, Martin, Singh and Wheeler, 1994;
Mani and Wheeler, 1997) have identified the same five 3-digit SIC sectors as large
outliers in air, water and toxic pollution intensity: Iron and Steel (SIC 371); Non-Ferrous
Metals (372); Industrial Chemicals (351); Pulp and Paper (341); and Non-Metallic
Mineral Products (369).  For the year 1987 (the same year as our plant sample), we have
estimated a log-log function which relates per capita income in all US counties to the
3 As might  be expected,  community  income  is highly  correlated  with community  education  in both
countries. After controlling  for income,  education  does not emerge  as significant  in either  set of
results. We  reproduce  the estimated  coefficient  for schooling  in Indonesia,  but have  dropped
education  from the final  US regressions.
13ratio of value added in 'dirty'  production (our five outlier sectors) to value added in other
manufacturing activities.
In this context, there can be a serious problem of simultaneity bias onlv if the
estimated effect of income on dirty-sector share is large and negative.  However, our
results (Table 3) show no relationship at all.  They reinforce our view that the
econometric result in Table 2 reflects the impact of income (and informal regulation) on
in situ abatement, not location.
Results for our other two community-related variables -- plant share of local
employment; population density -- are mixed.  Under informal regulation, there may be a
significant 'visibility effect' when polluting facilities can hide among other plants in
urban/industrial areas. If this effect dominates, population density should be positively
associated with emissions intensity.  When formal regulation ensures visibility by
requiring emissions reports, however, another effect should dominate: More densely-
populated areas should exert pressure for greater cleanup because more people are
adversely affected.  The latter effect should be particularly strong for conventional air
pollutants.  In the US, our results are consistent with this interpretation for TSP, the most
visible air pollutant.  However, no other US pollutant has a significant relationship with
population density.  In the case of Indonesia, the significant, positive association between
BOD intensity and population density is consistent with the dominance of the 'visibility
effect' in an unregulated economy.
Our results for plants' local employment share are also mixed and have no ready
interpretation.  Under informal regulation, the estimated impact of relative size will
reflect two considerations: the visibility of the plant as a polluter, and the benefits it
brings to the community as an employer.  Again, emissions reporting under formal
regulation should reduce or eliminate the visibility effect.  For regulated US pollutants,
we might therefore expect the employment benefit effect to dominate, with larger
employers having greater emissions intensity, ceteris paribus.  This is indeed the case,
although the effect is generally weak, except for the most visible pollutant, airborne TSP.
This has a marginally-significant negative association, as does informally-regulated BOD
in Indonesia.
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have used plant-level data from the US and Indonesia to test a
model of equilibrium pollution under informal regulation.  The model yields a reduced
form in which emissions intensity is related to variables in three categories:  standard
demand variables (scale, input prices); plant and firm characteristics (sector, efficiency,
vintage, ownership); and informal regulatory variables (community income, population
density, plant size relative to local economy).  We have estimated emissions regressions
14for four formally-regulated US pollutants (TSP, S02, BOD, TSS); toxic pollution from
US factories; and BOD emissions from Indonesian factories. Thus, the full set of
regressions also includes implicit controls for formal regulation and level of economic
development.
Our results suggest three common elements across countries and pollutants:
Abatement is generally subject to significant scale economies; within-country variations
in labor and energy prices have little impact on pollution intensity; and community
incomes have a powerful negative association with pollution intensity. Although the
plant and firm characteristics we have measured seem important in Indonesia (and other
Asian developing economies we have studied), only scale and sector have consistent,
significant effects in the US.
Our findings on community income are particularly important, since they suggest
a powerful role for informal regulation whether or not formal regulation is in place.  The
impact of income disparity on inter-county differences in US pollution intensities seems
to match the impact in Indonesia. Undoubtedly, this reflects differences in both
preference for environmental quality and ability to bring pressure on polluting factories.
The fact that such disparities exist in the US, even for traditionally regulated pollutants,
shows that US regulation has not been able to ensure uniform environmental quality for
all citizens regardless of income class.
15Table  1 - INDONESIA  (t-statistics in parentheses)




Log  [OUTPUT]  0.712
(3.78)***
Log  [WAGE]  -0.316
(0.52)
Log  [FUEL PRICE]  -1.267
(0.52)
D  [JAVA]  -1.530
(2.98)**
PLANT/FIRM VARIABLES
Log  [VA/WORKER]  -0.312
(1.79)*
Log  [AGE]  0.179
(1.07)
FOREIGN OWNERSHIP  0.0004
(0.06)
STATE OWNERSHIP  0.021
(2.91)**
COMMUNITY  VARIABLES
Log  [LOCAL EMPLOYMENT  -0.313
SHARE]  (1.84)*
Log  [INCOME PER CAPITA]  -2.811
(3.02)**
Log  [% GT PRIMARY  -0.668
EDUCATION]  (1.17)
Log  [POP. DENSITY]  0.128
(0.62)
D  [TEXTILES]  1.247
(3.41)***
D  [LEATHER TANNING]  1.961
(3.14)***
D  [FOOD]  2.480
(4.52)**
D  [PULP, PAPER]  2.265
(3.98)***
D  [WOOD PRODUCTS]  -0.930
(1.02)
OBSERVATIONS  250
ADJUSTED R'  .3805
a: White heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses; *Ho:  =0 rejected with 90%
confidence (2 tail);
**Ho:  =0 rejected with 95% confidence (2 tail); ***  Ho:  =0 rejected with 99% confidence (2 tail)
Source: Pargal and Wheeler (1996)
16Table  2 - US (t-statistics  in parentheses)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:  LOG OF POLLUTION INTENSITY
TOXICS  BOD  TSS  SO 2 TSP
INTERCEPT  6.18  3.38  5.54  21.73  16.77
(4.58)**'  (0.85)  (1.21)  (1.78)  (1.56)
ECONOMIC VARIABLES
Log  [OUTPUT]  0.69  0.37  0.50  0.91  0.88
(25.76)**  (4.86)***  (5.68)"**  (3.64)***  (4.04)"*
Log  [WAGE]  0.84  0.21  2.28  -3.03  1.39
(4.18)***  (0.39)  (3.60)*''  (1.56)  (0.81)
Log  [FUEL PRICE]  -.012  -0.09  -0.96  4.48  -0.13
(0.10)  (0.27)  (2.52)**  (2.69)**  (0.09)
PLANT/FIRM VARIABLES
Log  [VA/WORKER]  -0.16  -0.03  -0.14  0.94  0.39
(4.51)***  (0.31)  (1.20)  (2.91)"  (1.38)
Log  [AGE]  0.05  -0.11  -0.17  -0.31  0.42
(0.83)  (0.50)  (0.66)  (0.50)  (0.76)
COMMUNITY  VARIABLES
Log  [LOCAL EMPLOYMENT SHARE]  0.08  0.04  0.10  0.27  -0.34
(3.28)**  (0.58)  (1.17)  (1.10)  (1.56)
Log  [INCOME PER CAPITA]  -0.59  -0.51  -1.27  -2.85  -2.69
(3.58)*"  (1.08)  (2.35)**  (1.90)**  (2.03)**
Log  [POP. DENSITY]  0.02  -0.04  -0.03  0.13  -0.43
(0.54)  (0.54)  (0.35)  (0.56)  (2.02)"
D [TEXTILES, LEATHER]  1.77  0.58  1.41  2.11  3.26
(13.16)...  (i.53)  (3.24)**  (1.72)'  (3.02)**
D  [WOOD PRODUCTS]  0.99  -0.10  -0.02  -1.69  1.14
(7.67)**  (0.16)  (0.03)  (1.57)  (1.20)
D [PULP, PAPER]  1.78  2.98  2.93  0.78  -0.99
(14.76)***  (11.54)'*0  (9.85)***  (0.92)  (1.32)
D  [CHEMICALS)  1.44  -0.53  0.16  1.62  1.03
(16.01)***  (2.57)*  (0.66)  (2.18)*  (1.58)
D• NON-METALLIC MIN.]  0.51  -1.64  -0.48  1.01  3.53
(3.50)***  (4.15)*"  (1.05)  (1.09)  (4.36)**
D [METALS]  1.50  -2.03  0.1  -0.05  2.04
(13.02)*"  (8.13)**  (0.39)  (0.06)  (2.69)**
D [MACHINERY]  1.03  -1.87  -1.55  -3.39  -3.04
(I11.78)'"*  (8.54)''*  (6.14)"'*  (4.49)"'*  (4.58)'''
D [MISC. MANUFACTURING]  0.92  -1.33  3.38  -1.10  -3.33
(4.29)**  (1.37)  (3.01)**  (0.39)  (1.35)
OBSERVATIONS  11,827  1,343  1,343  869  869
ADJUSTED  R'  .196  .315  .273  .211  .205
*  Ho: = 0 rejected  with  90% confidence  (2 tail);  *  Ho: = 0 rejected  with  95% confidence  (2 tail); **
Ho:  = 0 rejected  with  99% confidence  (2 tail)
17Table 3:  Location of Pollution-Intensive Production vs. Income Per Capita:  US
Counties, 1987
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:  LOG (VAD  / VAo)a
INTERCEPT  -1.199
(0.66)
LOG (INCOME PER CAPITA)  -0.17
(0.88)
OBSERVATIONS  2,464
ADJUSTED R'  -.0001
a VAD  =  Value Added in the five most pollution-intensive three-digit sectors
VAo = Value Added in all other manufacturing sectors
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